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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TOMMIE MAURINE BROWN, 
vs. 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7959 
The respondent, plaintiff below, and mother of 
Ronald Glen Cook, age 3 years, instituted a habeas 
corpus proceeding directed against the defendants 
Harold Cook and Cora Cook, to gain custody of said 
child from the defendants, who, as paternal grand-
parents having physical custody of the child had 
refused to allow plaintiff custody of the child (Tr. 
25, 33). 
Plaintiff was divorced from her former husband, 
Glen H. Cook, father of the child, in the State of 
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Wyoming, by a decree of divorce which failed to 
award custody of the child to either party. The 
former husband, Glen Cook, is a member of the 
Armed Forces and as such was not within the state 
amenable to process, and had left the child with his 
parents, the defendants. 
Plaintiff was refused custody of the child by the 
paternal grandparents, and accordingly instituted 
these proceedings out of which the contempt proceed-
ings arose. Her testimony was to the effect that 
they (the grandparents) wouldn't let her take the 
child out of the yard CTr. 25) and appellant Harold 
Cook admitted on examination that his wife had 
refused to let plaintiff take the child CTr. 33). 
A writ of habeas corpus was served upon the 
defendants on December 1, 1952 ordering them to 
come before the court on December 9, 1952 at 10:00 
a.m. and to bring with them Ronald Glen Cook. 
( R. 3, 4.) The defendants appeared before the court 
on the day and at the hour appointed, but failed to 
bring with them the child, as ordered. Out of this 
failure arose the contempt proceeding and judgment. 
The record reveals that after the writ of habeas 
corpus was served upon him the grandfather imme-
diately telephoned and telegraphed his son who was 
in the Army in California CTr. 32, 33). VVhen he 
called his son, he told him that he had better cmne 
home CTr. 36). In response to this call and tele-
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gram, the son arrived in Vernal apparently on the 
evening of December 8, 1952 (Tr. 31) and imme-
diately proceeded to take the child, saying "I ain't 
going to stay here, I am going to take him and go." 
CTr. 31 ), and further, that he was going to get out 
of the State of Utah (Tr. 32). The grandfather made 
no protests, told no one of the fact that the father 
had taken the child, and consulted with no author-
ities as to what he should do (Tr. 31). Subsequently, 
in an effort to avoid the very obvious import of this 
testimony Mr. Cook sought to explain that his son 
hadn't said when he was going out of the State of 
Utah, Tr. 33), that he didn't know his son was going 
to take the boy (Tr. 35), and that he thought his 
son was going home and didn't know he was leaving 
the place with him(Tr. 36). The circumstances un-
der ·which the original statements were made and 
acts done, and the tenor of the examination and 
answers as revealed at page 36 of the transcript in 
particular are so evasive as to prompt the court in 
reviewing this matter to state at page 41: 
The Court finds that upon being served 
with the writ, the defendant Harold Cook did 
get in touch with the natural father, by tele-
phone and telegram, informed him of the pro-
ceedings, and urged him to come home; finds 
that the natural father did come ~home the 
day before the hearing; that he remained only 
a short while; that in the afternoon of the 
same day, or late-which may have been 
evening, the natural father declared to the 
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defendant Harold Cook in these words: "I 
ain't going to stay here, I am going to take 
him and go." 
The record does not show that the de-
fendant Harold Cook did anything other than 
to inform the natural father that he was sup-
posed to have the child in court the next day. 
He did not call his counsel for advice. He 
did not call counsel for the petitioner, to notify 
him of the son's claim. He made no effort to 
get counsel from any law officer such as the 
Sheriff who served the writ, "vho may have 
given him some advice. But without doing 
anything at all, and under circumstances 
where he could not, as shown by the wording, 
have misunderstood the purpose of the father, 
he permitted, and the Court feels strongly 
that he connived with the father, to take the 
child out of the jurisdiction of the Court. That 
was a direct violation of the order of the Court. 
His testimony before the Court establishes the 
fact of his contemptuous conduct, and the 
Court does find him guilty of contempt of 
court." 
The Court also found that as between the mother 
and the paternal grandparents that the mother was 
entitled to the custody of the child, and that she was 
a fit and proper person to have the custody of the 
child, which was the issue directly presented by the 
habeas corpus proceedings. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
The Court correctly ruled that as between plain-
tiff and the defendants the Plaintiff was entitled to 
the custody of the child. 
II 
No affidavit was necessary in order to hold the 
Defendant Harold Cook in contempt of Court. 
III 
The evidence sustains the order of the Court 
committing defendant Harold Cook for contempt 
of Court. 
IV 
No prejudicial error appears in the record stem-
ming from the Court's ruling giving the defendant 
Harold Cook the opportunity to produce the child. 
v 
The Court acted within its jurisdiction . in sen-
tencing the Defendant for contempt. The findings 
of the Court and its conclusions therefrom as stated 
in the record were sufficient to authorize the judg-
ment of contempt. Any further findings of the 
Court were waived. 
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The Court correctly ruled that as between plaintiff 
and the Defendants the Plaintiff was entitled to the 
custody of the three year old child. 
Perhaps at the outset of the argument on this 
point it would be well to point out that there is no 
evidence that the child was out of the jurisdiction of 
the Court at the time of the hearing at 10:00 a.m. 
December 9, 1952. The only evidence as to this is 
the statement of Glen Cook that he was taking the 
child to California. He took the child on the evening 
of December 8, and left, and his whereabout there-
after was either not known or not divulged. If he 
was in the process of taking the child to. California, 
then the likelihood is that the child was still in Utah 
the following morning. Glen Cook left his auto-
mobile at Vernal, and since no railroad services this 
area, he 1nust have left for California by bus, which 
would mean that he would cross the entire state of 
Utah from east to west before leaving Utah. 
Ho\'vever, the law is clear that where the court 
has jurisdiction of the parties to a custody proceeding, 
the physical absence of the child after institution of 
the proceedings, or even before, in no wise affects 
the jurisdiction of the court to make the adjudication 
of custody. Therefore, it is of little concern from 
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a legal standpoint whether the child was or was 
not out of the jurisdiction of the court. 
In Little v. Little, (Ala.) 30 So. 2d 386, the court 
held that once jurisdiction had attached in a custody 
suit that the jurisdiction of the court was not divested 
by removal of the child from the state by its mother. 
In Maloney v. Maloney, 67 Cal. App. 2d 278, 
15+ P. 2d +~6, where the father took the children 
out of the state while a suit for their custody was 
pending, the court in holding that the court retained 
jurisdiction to a"vard their custody said: " ... Juris-
diction once acquired is not defeated by subsequent 
events which might have prevented jurisdiction had 
they occurred before personal service of the action 
was made ... " 
In Roberts v. Roberts, 300 Ky. 454, 189 S.W. 
2d 691, the court, in reiterating this same rule points 
out that to hold otherwise would make it virtually 
impossible to arrive at a final determination of the 
custody of a child because all that would be necessary 
would be to remove the child from the jurisdiction 
before the judgment was entered. 
To like effect is Cole v. Cole, 194 Miss. 292, 12 
So. 2d 425; McMillan v. McMillan, 114 Colo., 24 7 
158 P. 2d 444; State v. Porterfield, 221 Mo. App. 874, 
285 S.W. 786; Burckhalter v. Conyer, 285 S.W. 606 
and Peacock v. Bradshaw, 194 S.W. 2d 551. 
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In the instant case, the Court had jurisdiction ·at 
the time the writ was served and the complaint and 
petition filed, and the fact that the child was taken 
from the state thereafter would in no wise defeat 
the right of the Court to adjudicate custody as be-
tween the mother and the paternal grandparents. 
An examination of the cases cited by Appellant under 
this point reveals nothing to the contrary. 
It is to be noted that nowhere does appellant 
raise the contention that factually the mother was 
not entitled to the award of custody, but only that the 
Court had no jurisdiction to make the award. 
POINT II 
No affidavit was necessary in order to hold the 
Defendant Harold Cook in contempt of Court. 
Appellant's argument at point 2 of his brief 
proceeds upon the assumption that the contempt 
involved was committed out of the presence of the 
Court, and he relies among others upon the case of 
Robinson vs. City Council for Ogden, 112 Utah 36, 
185 P. 2d 256, \Vhich involved contemptuous conduct 
and speech in the presence of the judge as an indi-
vidual, but not in the presence of the Court in the 
legal sense. The law is clear, that indir~ct or con-
structive contempts should be prosecuted by affidavit. 
However, the case before the court is not such a case. 
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\Vhile it is true that the acts which rendered it 
impossible for the defendant Harold Cook to comply 
with the order of the Court were not concluded in 
the presence of the Court, this does not control the 
question of "'hether the contempt was in fact com-
mitted in the presence of the Court. As the Court 
points out at pages 40 and 41 of the transcript: 
''The record should show, that the writ 
of habeas corpus in this matter is in due form, 
that it commanded the defendants, Harold 
Cook and Cora Cook, to: 'Appear before the 
Judge of the above-entitled court on the 9th 
day of December, 1952, at the courtroom in 
the County Courthouse at Vernal, Utah, at the 
hour of 10 o'clock a.m., and to bring with you 
the person of Ronald Glen Cook, then and 
there to be dealt with according to law." 
* * * 
"The record in this case already shows 
that at the time commanded in the writ, the 
respondents to the writ failed to have the 
person of Ronald Glen Cook before the Court 
as commanded by the writ." 
Therein lies the essence of the contempt of 
Court in the instant case. The order of the Court 
which was violated was an order requiring the de-
fendants to bring the boy before the court at a time 
certain, and the contempt consisted of failing to pro-
duce the boy at that time before the court. 
The concept of "presence of the court" is perhaps 
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best illustrated by the situation of an affirmative act, 
as where the court calls for order, and someone phy-
sically present disobeys that order by continuing 
boistrous. However, the negative act of disobedience 
is nonetheless committed in the presence of the Court, 
where, as here, upon order the defendant failed to 
do in the presence of the court that which he was 
instructed to do. The negative act in this case. con-
sisted of failure to bring the child into court. 
As recognized in the case of State vs. Morris, 
120 Wash. 146, 207 P. 18, where a receiver failed to 
report receipts to the court as ordered by the court, 
negative acts may constitute direct contempt. 
In Smythe vs. Smythe, 28 Okl. 2826, 114 P. 257, 
the Court had before it facts very similar to those here 
involved, except that the writ of habeas corpus was 
directed against the father of a minor child rather 
than against the grandparent. 
The court reviewed the general law, \vhich is to 
the effect that contempts are divided into two classes 
( 1) Direct con tempts committed in the presence of 
the Court, and (2) Constructive contempts which 
arise out of matters not transpiring in the presence 
of the Court. The Court reviewed numerous 
authorities and holds that violation of an order to 
produce the person of a minor child constitutes a 
direct contempt of the court in its presence. 
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As indicated in 12 Am. Jur. 391, Contempt Sec. 
4: "Negative acts may also constitute direct contempt, 
as for instance, failure to produce a prisoner at a 
trial or hearing" ... At page 390 of the same work 
the classification is noted, that direct or indirect 
contempt depends upon whether the contempt is 
committed within or outside the presence of the court. 
The reason, of course, for an affidavit where 
the contempt is committed out of the presence of the 
court is to apprise the court of the facts claimed to 
constitute contempt. The theory is that the court 
is unaware of the disparagement of its dignity or 
authority in such case, and it is necessary therefore 
that the court in some way be advised of the violation. 
This is illustrated in the ordinary situation of an 
alimony or support money order which is not com-
plied with. The proper vehicle to bring to the court's 
attention the failure to comply with the court's order 
would be by affidavit. 
Examine for a moment the facts of this case. 
Did not the Court have the full and complete knowl-
edge of the failure of the defendant Harold Cook to 
produce the boy before him? How would an affi-
davit have provided the court with any more or 
additional information than it then had? As to the 
defendant Harold Cooks' opportunity to defend 
against the contempt charged- his own counsel put 
him on the stand, and he was examined and cross-
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examined at length. He can scarcely claim at this 
point that he was not given adequate notice of the 
contempt proceeding or that he lacked opportunity 
to defend against the charge. 
Tested then, by the standard of whether the 
court knew of his own knowledge of the failure to 
comply with its order, it is apparent that this is not 
the situation contemplated by the statute where an 
affidavit would be required. I-Iad counsel in this 
case prepared an affidavit, it would have recited 
exactly the facts which the court had first hand 
knowledge of, that is, that the defendant failed to 
bring the boy into court as ordered. 
The contempt here committed and punished 
was a direct contempt commited in the presence 
of the Court. This also provides a full and complete 
answer to points No. 8 and 9 of Appellant's brief. 
To amplify, however, in rebuttal of point 7 of 
appellant's brief, and to illustrate the lack of merit 
thereof, the record utterly fails to sustain the conten-
tion of the appellant that he was not given an oppor-
tunity to answer and present evidence a provided b)' 
law. 
At page 2 of the transcript of testimony, as an 
introductory preface to the proceedings before the 
court, Counsel for petitioner stated: 
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MR. HAMMOND: In this matter your 
honor., the plaintiff and petitioner is ready to 
proceed. Mr. Nash has brought a matter to my 
attention in this. Perhaps we should inform 
the Court. Mr. Nash informs me that last 
night the father of the minor child came into 
Vernal and took him out of the state of Utah, 
as far as you know; is that right? 
Whereupon, the following colloquy ;took place: 
MR. NASH: As far as the folks know. 
I \Yas retained Saturday night, or Sunday, I 
should say, to go over this matter and to at-
tempt a defense, and I was preparing it. And 
this morning I was advised that the father had 
taken the child. The parents are here, the 
grandparents, and the persons whom the writ 
was issued against, they are here in court. 
THE COURT: Do you have any question 
about \'Vhether the grandparents may be guilty 
of contempt in allowing the child to go out, 
after service of the Order? 
MR. HAMMOND: It would seem to me 
that they would be, because the child was here 
when they were served with an order requir-
ing them to have him in court this morning. 
MR. NASH: The grandparents - I ex-
plored that possibility, your Honor, and I 
don't see how they could be guilty of con-
tempt, because the custody of that child was 
not awarded to the grandparents. 
THE COURT: It doesn't make any dif-
ference. They had it when the order was 
served. 
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It is apparent therefore, that the matter of con-
tempt of court was raised at the very outset of the 
hearing. Not only that, but Mr. Harold Cook was 
called as a witness by his counsel, and the gist of his 
examination was an abortive attempt to justify his 
failure to comply with the order of the court rather 
than being directed to the question of right of custody 
as between the mother and the paternal grandparents 
(Tr. 30, 31, 32). 
At page 32 of the transcript of evidence the 
court said: 
"The questions that are before the court 
i.e., whether or not this Court could decree 
her right to the child as against the defendants, 
and the question of the contempt of the de-
fendant Harold Cook, are matters which the 
Court doesn't want to decide hastily, and the 
Court will therefore take those two matters 
under advisement." 
* * * 
"Of course as to Mr. Cook, it must he 
understood that if the Court calls hirn back 
for entry of any order in respect to the ron-
tempt motion that is made, that he will re-
spond. Oherwise the Court will issue a bench 
warrant for him. You will also advise him 
of that fact, will you not?" 
Thereupon, the court took the matter under 
advisement and did not rule thereon until the after-
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noon of December 11, 1952, at which time the Court 
review·ed for counsel at some length the evidence 
and the law before making his findings as to con-
tempt. 
Thus, to this point there can be no question but 
that appellant and his counsel vvere well aware of the 
contempt proceeding in progress and had done what 
they could to rebut it. If appellant felt that he had 
not been given an adequate hearing (since quite ob-
viously he had been given a hearing and had at-
tempted a defense) then it was incumbent upon him 
to raise this matter with the court in order that a 
fuller hearing could be had if he so desired. This 
he did not do, and in fact, in answer to the question 
asked by the Court as set out by appellant in his 
brief at page 20, as to whether defendant was pre-
pared to receive judgment of the court, counsel for 
defendant answered: (Tr. 42) "He is, your honor." 
In response to the query of the court as to whether 
any reason existed why judgment should not be pro-
nounced at that time, the defendant answered: (Tr. 
42) "No." 
At all stages of the proceeding the defendant 
Harold Cook was apprised of the fact that the court 
was reviewing the question of contempt of court for 
failure to comply with the writ of habeas corpus; and 
therefore no merit exists in point 7 of appellant's 
brief. 
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POINT Ill 
The evidence sustains the order of the Court com-
mitting defendant Harold Cook for contempt of Court. 
In point 3, 4 and 5 of appellants brief they attack 
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings 
as made by the Court with respect to the contempt 
proceeding arising out of the habeas corpus proceed-
ing and the failure of Harold Cook to produce the boy 
as ordered by the Court. 
We have heretofore reviewed the facts which 
prompted the court to hold the appellant Harold 
Cook in contempt. To recapitulate however, the 
writ commanding the defendants to produce the boy 
was served upon them at a time when they held 
physical custody of the child, and could comply with 
the order. Defendant immediately set about to ren-
der the order of the court impossible of performance 
by telephoning and telegraphing his son to the effect 
that he better come home. Upon the son arriving the 
evening before the morning upon which the child 
was to be produced, despite the fact that the son 
quite clearly and distinctly, and under circumstances 
which could scarcely have been misunderstood, indi-
cated to the defendant Harold Cook, that he proposed 
to take the child out of the State ( Tr. 31 ) , the de-
fendant Harold Cook did absolutely nothing to alter 
this course of events. To the contrary, the evasive 
attitude of the dPfendant in court, his very apparent 
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effort to avoid the effect of his own testimony when it 
became apparent to him that he had already said too 
much, make it amply clear that the whole course 
of events \Yas intended for the sole purpose of getting 
the child out of the reach of the petitioner in violation 
of the order of the court. In so doing, he not only 
made no reasonable effort to insure that he could 
comply with the order of the Court, but actively 
sought to thwart that order. 
The chain of events is such that only one con-
clusion logically follows; that the defendant Harold 
Cook made every effort to thwart the order of the 
Court, made every effort to place it out of his power 
to comply with the order of the Court, and went to 
all lengths to prevent the court from discovering 
the truth of the matter at the hearing. As the court 
expressed it: "The court feels strongly that he 
connived with the father to take the child out of the 
jurisdiction of the Court. That was a direct violation 
of the order of the court. His testimony before the 
court establishes the fact of his contemptuous con-
duct and the court does find him guilty of contempt." 
(Tr. 42). 
The law is clear that where a person has ren-
dered himself unable to comply with an order of the 
court he stands on the same footing as one having 
the ability who nonetheless refuses. 12 Am. Jur. 
Contempt p. 406, Sec. 24. At 12 Am. Jur. p. 439, 
Contempt Sec. 72, the statement is made: 
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". . . Where an alleged contemner, ho\\'-
ever has voluntarily and contumaciously 
brought on himself disability to obey an order 
or decree, he cannot avail himself of a plea 
of inability to obey as a defense to a charge of 
contempt. A person who seeks to satisfy. the 
court that his failure to obey an order or decree 
was due entirely to his inability to render obe-
dience without fault on his part, must prove 
such inability ... " 
and see also to like effect Mary Jane Stevens Com-
pany vs. Foley, 67 Utah 578, 248 p. 815. 
The court in determining that appellant Harold 
Cook was guilty of contempt of court found that the 
defendant failed to notify the sheriff or other official, 
his own counsel, or counsel for the plaintiff that Glen 
Cook was in the act of taking or had taken the child 
away. The court did not, as appellant suggests, base 
the entire contempt upon failure to perform any one 
of these acts, but to the contrary found these facts 
along with the facts heretofore enumerated were 
sufficient to indicate a contempt of court and that in 
other words, the defense asserted was insufficient. 
The court's judgment need not stand on any indi-
vidual single finding with respect to the asserted de-
fense of inability to comply, but all must be looked 
to in establishing the contempt. 
When all of the facts are put together~ that is, 
prior refusal to let the mother take the child; infornl-
ing the father he better come home immediately, 
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defendants actions and knowledge with respect there-
to and with respect to his son having taken the boy 
ostensibly to California the same evening, without 
any remonstrance or other attempt to stop him; his 
deliberate and calculated failure to notify anyone 
of these facts \Yhile opportunity existed to insure that 
the order of the court could and would be complied 
with, and his patent efforts at covering up the details 
of the transaction and evading direct answer to 
questions to the extent that the court concluded there-
from that he had connived with his son to defeat the 
order of the court, are sufficient in every respect to 
sustain the judgment of the court. 
Appellant asserts that under the case of Sherry 
vs. Doyle, 68 Utah 74, 249 P. 250, this court has 
announced the rule that the father has the para-
mount right to care and custody of his children. Of 
course, this is a relative matter, and it is well estab-
lished in this state that the mother has paramount 
right to the care and custody of children of tender 
years. Sec. 30-1-10, U.C.A. 1953; Briggs vs. Briggs, 
111 Utah 418, 121 p. 2d 223; Baker vs. Baker, 110 
Utah 462, 175 p. 2d 213. 
Factually, the appellant can get no comfort 
from the Sherry vs. Doyle case, since the court merely 
held in a habeas corpus proceeding that as between 
the father and third persons that the father was en-
titled to custody. 
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The problem here involved is not one of para-
mount rights to custody of the child, but rather, can 
one having the ability to comply with an order stand 
by or even assist in rendering it impossible to comply 
with the order of the court, then come before the 
court and say "I can't now comply because I let 
someone having a paramount right take the child." 
In this instance the important thing was an order of 
the court, which was paramount and prior to any 
custodial rights of any of the parties involved in this 
unfortunate situation. The books are replete with 
cases where property, articles and things, are ordered 
held or produced before the court without regard 
to the ultimate rights which may be affected thereby. 
The very purpose of this order was to revievv the 
custody question- as between the parties to the habeas 
corpus proceeding. The paramount right in this 
instance was the order of the court that the child 
be produced. The ultimate rights of the parties 
involved could in no way affect the validity of the 
temporary charge placed upon the defendants that 
they should see to it that the child was produced on 
the day and at the time ordered. The situation 
would not be altered by the fact that an infant was 
involved rather than an inanimate object or a sum of 
money or some other article or thing which the court 
might have ordered produced at a given time. 
Clearly, had the court ordered the defendant Harold 
Cook to bring money in his possession before thP 
court on a day certain, he would not havP felt that 
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he had the right to turn it over to one of the persons 
who asserted that he had some right therein. Par-
ticularly where he knew that another was asserting 
rights therein which were to be the subject of the pro-
ceeding before the court. 
POINT IV 
No preiudicial error appears in the record stemming 
from the Court's ruling giving the defendant Harold Cook 
an opportunity to produce the child. 
The fact that the Court after having pronounced 
judgment upon defendant for contempt of court felt 
constrained to give him an opportunity of securing 
forgiveness of a portion of that judgment can in no 
way be advanced as prejudicial error by the de-
fendant. This is a matter favorable to the defendant, 
of which he has no cause to complain. The judgment 
of the Court was not conditional, but the court an-
nounced the following pronouncement of judgment 
that under certain circumstances he would remit a 
portion of that judgment. So long as the judgment 
of contempt is itself sustainable, which it clearly is, 
the fact that t4e court was willing to lessen the 
stringency of that judgment regardless of the terms, 
is not prejudicial to the defendant. 
The fact that the court sought to rectify an 
otherwise unsatisfactory situation of the father in 
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the service having taken physical custody of the 
child under circumstances where he obviously could 
not take care of the child and adequately supervise 
the child, an infant of three years, and would be 
wholly unable to attend to the child's needs, and to 
bring about a condition where the child could be 
properly attended by his mother as it should under 
Utah Lavv, is a laudable thing, rather than a matter 
of censure as defendant would seem by his argument 
to indicate. 
The facts as they exist with reference to the 
status of the father of the child and the obvious 
inability to make him a party or even suspect or anti-
cipate the need for such action, are such as to elimi-
nate any force or effect of defendant's argument 
based upon failure to include the father of the child 
in the habeas corpus proceeding; and the argument, 
apparently designed to indicate her general unfitness 
to have custody of the child, is completely eliminated 
by the finding of the court in the habeas corpus pro-
ceeding that the mother is a fit and proper person 
to have custody of the child, from which finding the 
defendant has not appealed. The mother quite ob-
viously had not forfeited any custodial rights, and 
there is no merit to the argument along these linPs. 
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POINT V 
The Court acted within its iurisdiction in sentencing 
the Defendant for contempt. The findings of the Court 
and its conclusions therefrom as stated in the record 
were suHicient to authorize the iudgment of contempt. 
Any further findings of the Court were waived. 
Appellant in his brief suggests that there were 
no findings and that findings were not waived, and 
that therefore the court lacked jurisdiction to sen-
tence the defendant for contempt. Appellant how-
ever, has set up as points 3, 4 and 5 of his brief what 
amounts to an attack upon the findings of the court, 
as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain those 
findings. Thus, apparently he has no trouble in 
determining precisely what the trial court found, 
from the record as it now stands. 
On December 11, 1952, at the subsequent hear-
ing of the matters here involved, the court, in con-
siderable detail, as indicated by the transcript be-
ginning at page 40, set forth his findings with respect 
to the contempt proceeding. He stated in detail his 
findings \tvith respect to what the defendant Harold 
Cook had done and had failed to do, and his con-
clusion that the defendant Harold Cook was guilty of 
contempt, and based thereon pronounced judgment 
committing and fining defendant for that contempt. 
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In the case of Hillyard v. District Court of Cache 
County, 68 Utah 220, 249 p. 806, the court affirmed 
the rule that in contempt cases findings and con-
clusions are necessary. The court stated, however: 
". . . We are not to be understood as 
holding that formal findings are absolutely 
requisite to support a judgment, but it must 
appear from the judgment or elsewhere in the 
record that the court has found facts necessary 
to support its judgment . . . " 
Admitting that more formal written findings 
and conclusions would have been desirable in the 
case, however, it cannot be successfully argued that 
no findings were made, nor that no conclusion was 
drawn therefrom, since the record, certified as a 
true report of the proceedings, recites the findings in 
arnple detail to sustain the judgment. The .argument 
by the appellant is that there were no findings or 
conclusions. The record reveals that there were 
findings and conclusions which lays this point at 
rest. 
The real problem thus is not the absence of 
findings and conclusions, but whether or not the 
findings in the form in which they appear in the 
record satisfy the requirement of Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P., 
which point hovvever, appellant does not raise. 
All that Rule 52 (a) requires is that the court 
shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
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conclusions of law thereon. No requirement as to 
form of findings is in anywise set forth in the rule 
nor is it specified with what formality they must be 
drafted. 'Ve do have a guide, however, in the Hill-
yard case 'vhich says that formal findings are not 
necessary, but only that it must appear from the 
record that the court has found facts necessary to 
support its judgment. 
In the present instance, the findings, although 
announced orally by the court, were recorded as a 
part of the record just as fully as had the court in 
chambers dictated the same to his reporter. The 
ultimate responsibility for preparing findings of fact 
rests with the court rather than counsel, and if the 
court in a given case should see fit to alter, limit, 
expand or reword proposed findings submitted by 
counsel, he would, of course, be entitled to do so, 
and he would then dictate the changes or new find-
ings to the reporter. Whether that dictation is 
effected with the formality which surrounds a sep-
arately prepared document, or whether it merely 
partakes of findings by the court in open court 
written down by the reporter, would appear to make 
little, if any, difference. That these were the only 
findings which the court proposed to make or pro-
posed should be made in the contempt proceeding 
is indicated in the record quite clearly at the bottom 
of page 45 of the transcript. Thus, we do not have 
the problem of these being merely an oral pro-
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nouncement of the things which he proposed to 
include in later written findings .. Rather, they con-
stituted the only written findings which he proposed 
to make in the case. 
It is earnestly asserted and respectfully sub-
mitted that the findings of the court in the present 
instance satisfy the requirements of Rule 52 (a), 
and that the problem is not absence of findings as 
appellant raises the issue, but rather sufficiency as 
to form and formality. · 
In the event, however, that it should be con-
cluded that there is an absence of findings in this 
case, we believe that the record amply sustains the 
proposition that there has been a waiver of the need 
for such findings. 
Counsel for the defendant stated to the court 
that defendant was ready to receive the judgment of 
the court, and defendant state that no legal reason 
existed why judgment should not be pronounced 
(Tr. 42). 
The following discussion occurred during thP 
proceedings held on December 11, 1952, at the time 
th~ court anl).ounced his findings, conclusions and 
judgment. 
MR. NASH: Your Honor, rl~fPndants 
now make a motion for a re-hearing of this 
matter. 
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THE COURT: Can you make a motion 
for a re-hearing that way, Mr. Nash? 
* * * 
lVIR. NASH: I would like to make that as 
a motion your Honor. 
* * * 
THE COURT: There must be findings 
and conclusions. Our Supreme Court has held 
that there must be on habeas corpus matters. 
That is 'vhat made me ask. Until the judg-
ment of the Court on the writ is made- now 
of course on your contempt, the judgment is 
made, isn't it? 
MR. NASH: Yes. 
It would appear that defendant waived any 
further findings and conclusions other than those 
theretofore made and entered, and any informality 
existing therein was approved by the defendant to 
the extent, at least, that he cannot now avoid the 
judgment on this ground. 
It should perhaps be pointed out that a super-
sedeas bond has been filed in this matter, with 
relation to the contempt judgment, and that said 
judgment has not been executed. Accordingly, if 
the court were to conclude that no findings and 
conclusions of law are present, and if the court con-
cludes that there has not been a waiver of findings 
in a more formal form, then it would seem that 
under the record before the Court and the law cited 
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by appellant to the effect that a party cannot be 
committed for contempt in the absence of findings 
and conclusions (Ex parte Gerber, 84 Utah 441, 29 
P. 2d 932) that the proper disposition of this segment 
of the case would be to remand the matter to the 
district court for written findings prior to any com-
mittment being issued based thereon, and that other-
wise the judgment could and should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it is respectfully submitted that 
so far as the habeas corpus proceedings is concerned, 
that the record amply sustains the decision of the 
lower court. 
It is further respectfully submitted that as to 
the contempt proceeding arising out of the failure of 
the appellant to produce the child before the court 
as ordered, that the court was clearly justified under 
the circumstances in holding the defendant in con-
tempt of court for his obvious failure to comply with 
the order of the court or make any effort whatsoever 
to comply with that order, that it is incumbent upon 
the court under similar circumstances to vindicatP 
its authority and preserve its sanctity and the sanc-
tity of its order and judgments, that no prejudicial 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
error 'vas committed therein, and that the court had 
jurisdiction and authority to act as it did. 
Respectfully submitted, 
COLTON & HAMMOND 
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD 
Attorneys for Petitioner and 
Respondent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
